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It is generally accepted among academic economists and lawyers that the 
ownership structure chosen at the initial public offering (IPO) stage is ef- 
ficient. The costs and benefits of the chosen ownership structure-the  argu- 
ment goes-are  reflected in the price the owner can fetch for her shares 
(Jensen and Meckling  1976). Consequently, the owner of a private firm 
taking it public will fully internalize the costs and benefits of her choice. 
Ergo, the ownership structure chosen at the IPO stage is socially efficient. 
This view has served as the foundation for much of the positive and norm- 
ative work in corporate finance. 
This  paper  shows that  the  ownership  structure chosen  by  a  value- 
maximizing entrepreneur at the IPO stage might differ from the socially 
optimal one. Interestingly, we  show this while retaining all the standard 
assumptions: efficient markets populated by rational agents who maximize 
the total value of their payoffs. 
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The reason for the identified inefficiency is an externality that the choice 
of ownership structure has on potential  buyers of control.  In fact,  the 
initial choice of ownership structure will have important  effects on the 
welfare of the initial owner, the dispersed shareholders, and the potential 
buyer. Of course, a rational entrepreneur will fully internalize the effects 
that the ownership structure will have on her future wealth. Moreover, she 
will fully internalize the effects that the ownership structure will have on 
the dispersed shareholders because, in an efficient market, those effects 
are reflected in the IPO price. But the initial owner will not internalize the 
effects of the ownership structure on the surplus captured by potential 
buyers (as long as the potential  buyer is still willing to buy). This will 
create a wedge between the choices that are optimal from the initial own- 
er’s point of view and the choices that are socially efficient. As we  argue, 
the magnitude of this wedge is  a function of the degree of competition 
in  the market  for corporate control. In a perfectly  competitive market 
for corporate control, the wedge will disappear, and the privately optimal 
choice of ownership structure coincides with the socially efficient one.’ 
Specifically, our model includes three ways in which the initial choice 
of ownership structure affects potential buyers of control. First, this choice 
will influence whether a transfer of control will take place, affecting both 
the likelihood of a control transfer and the circumstances under which it 
will occur. The likelihood and circumstances of control transfer, in turn, 
affect  the  expected  surplus  that  potential  buyers  can  be  expected  to 
capture. 
Second, in those control transfers that will take place, the initial dis- 
tribution of ownership will influence the division of surplus between the 
initial shareholders and the control buyer. This, again, will affect the ex- 
pected surplus of potential future buyers. 
Third, should a control transfer take place, the initial distribution  of 
ownership might affect the value of the company under the control buyer. 
For example, if  the initial ownership is dispersed and the control buyer 
wants to move to a more concentrated ownership (because that would be 
a more efficient structure), such a change might be difficult to accomplish. 
This, yet again, might affect the surplus that a potential control buyer can 
expect to capture. 
To demonstrate our thesis, we focus on one important choice that initial 
I. The idea that private choices made by  those who set up a company might differ from 
the socially optimal ones was first introduced by Grossman and Hart (1980). Grossman and 
Hart, however, take as given the choice of ownership structure (dispersed ownership in their 
case), and they focus on the choice of the dilution factor in takeovers. Subsequent work on 
the divergence between private and social optimality in the setting up of a company also 
takes the ownership structure as given and focuses on choices concerning the rules governing 
control transfers (see, e.g., Bebchuk and Kahan 1990; and Bebchuk 1994). In contrast to the 
existing work, we  endogenize the choice of ownership structure, and we  analyze the diver- 
gence between private and social optimality in making this basic choice. Ownership Structures and the Decision to Go Public  57 
owners make. Specifically, we analyze the initial owner’s choice between a 
privately held (PR) company, in which the company remains private and 
the initial owner retains complete ownership of the firm’s cash-flow rights, 
and a publicly owned (PU) company, in which the initial owner retains 
control of the firm but sells some of the firm’s cash-flow rights to public 
investors. This is the choice that an owner faces in deciding whether to 
go public.* 
Because of the three general effects noted above, the privately optimal 
choice between a PR and a PU structure generally differs from the socially 
optimal one. Not only do we demonstrate the existence of such a distor- 
tion, but we  also explore its likely direction. Much of our analysis is de- 
voted to identifying the conditions under which this distortion will be in 
the direction of PR structures and the conditions under which it will be 
in the direction of PU structures. 
Our results indicate which empirical evidence would be needed to deter- 
mine the direction of the identified distortions. Some such evidence al- 
ready exists, and combining our results with that evidence suggests that, 
in the United States, the distortion is likely to be in the direction of an 
excessive incidence of going public. As is well  known, the incidence of 
IPOs (adjusted for population) is larger in the United States than in other 
advanced economies (see La Porta et al. 1997). While this large incidence 
of IPOs is generally taken to be a socially optimal outcome, our results 
suggest the possibility that this incidence is excessive. We  should empha- 
size, however, that much more empirical work, along the lines suggested 
by  our analytic conditions, would be needed before firm conclusions on 
the direction of the distortion can be reached. 
Our analysis is also shown to have policy implications for the legal rules 
governing the sale of control blocks. We analyze how the equal opportu- 
nity rule, the main contender to the market rule prevailing in the United 
States, affects the direction of the distortion. More important, we identify 
a regulatory approach for sales of control blocks that could in principle 
eliminate the identified distortions. We  show that, if  legal rules were to 
ensure that  sales of  control  blocks  neither  benefit  nor  harm  minority 
shareholders, then the choice between PR and PU would not be distorted. 
We examine whether and how rules could be designed to accomplish such 
a result. 
There is a large literature on the costs and benefits of a PU structure as 
compared with those of a PR structure (see, e.g., Jensen and Meckling 
1976; Shleifer and Vishny  1986; Holmstrom  and Tirole  1993; Zingales 
2. Bebchuk (1999)-which  we discuss briefly in our concluding remarks-analyzes  poten- 
tial distortions in another important choice made by the initial owner. Specifically, that paper 
studies the choice, in the event that the initial owner chooses to go public, between a struc- 
ture with a controlling shareholder and a structure without a controlling shareholder. 58  Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Luigi Zingales 
1995; Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi 1997; Bolton and von Thadden 1998; 
and Pagano and Roe11  1998). This literature  largely assumes that initial 
owners will choose the most efficient structure and focuses on identifying 
the factors that influence initial owners’  choice^.^ In contrast, our model 
focuses on a consideration  that  drives a wedge between  initial owners’ 
choice and social optimality. 
Section 2.1 of the paper describes the framework of analysis. Section 
2.2 demonstrates the existence of a distortion. Section 2.3 derives condi- 
tions that help us identify the direction of this distortion. Section 2.4 dis- 
cusses possible extensions of the model. Section 2.5 discusses the model’s 
policy implications for the rules governing control transfers. Section 2.6 
concludes. 
2.1  The Framework 
We consider an initial owner, I, who owns all the shares of a firm and 
decides whether she should maintain the company as a privately held (PR) 
concern  or take it public (PU) by  selling a fraction a  of her cash-flow 
rights. In the latter case, we assume that she always retains a majority of 
voting rights and, hence, control of the ~ompany.~  Since, through the use 
of dual class stocks and stock pyramids, I can retain control while selling 
an a  much greater than 50 percent, we let (Y vary between zero and one. 
The problem is interesting only if there is a difference between the value 
that an individual investor attributes to a company’s shares and the value 
of a controlling block. Let  Y,  be the value of the verifiable cash flow pro- 
duced by the company, that is, the value that a risk-neutral outside inves- 
tor will pay for the company’s cash flow. Let B, be the difference between 
the value  of the company for the incumbent (V,) and the value of the 
verifiable cash flow (Y,):  B, = V, - Y,. For convenience, we refer to B, as 
the private benefits of control to I even though B, also includes the costs 
of contr01.~ 
We make the conventional assumption that the values of V,, Y,, and B, 
are affected by the fraction a  of cash-flow rights that the initial owner sells 
to outside shareholders. The total value of a company (V,)  will be affected 
by the fraction a  for various reasons. On the one hand, going public may 
reduce value because of the transaction costs involved in the process (Rit- 
3. A notable exception is Pagano (1993). Pagano argues that the number of public compa- 
nies may be excessively low from a social point of view  because the initial owner bears all 
the costs of listing but reaps only part of the gains of increased diversification opportunities 
that she provides other owners. 
4. In future work, we plan to analyze private vs. social optimality in the choice between 
going public while retaining control (PU) and moving further to dispersed ownership. 
5. Note that this definition is more general than the one commonly used in the literature. 
B, includes both the private benefits  of control and the costs associated with control. For 
instance, B, can be negative if the initial owner is very risk averse. Ownership Structures and the Decision to Go Public  59 
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Fig. 2.1  Timing of the events 
ter 1987) and, more important, because of the agency costs thereby created 
(Jensen  and Meckling  1976).6  On the other hand, going public may in- 
crease the value of a company by spreading risk, by increasing the amount 
of information for compensating employees (Holmstrom and Tirole 1993), 
or by preventing a large shareholder from interfering with the company’s 
management (Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi 1997). 
We  define 1 -  a:  as the optimal fraction of cash-flow rights that the 
incumbent should retain: 
We make no assumptions about the value of a:.  In other words, consistent 
with Demsetz (1983), we  do not assume that the efficient level of owner- 
ship is necessarily  100 percent, and we  allow for the optimal a to vary 
from case to case. We also make no assumptions about the shape of the 
function V,(a).  We  do not even assume that  V,(a)  is a continuous func- 
tion. In particular, we want to allow for the possibility of a discontinuity 
at a = 0. In fact, there are some fixed costs associated with the decision 
to go public, costs that will be borne independently of the fraction a sold 
to outside investors, provided that a > 0. 
The timing of the events is summarized in figure 2.1. At time 0, an initial 
owner, I, makes a choice between maintaining complete ownership or mov- 
ing to a controlling-shareholder  structure by selling a fraction a of her 
shares to the public. 
Between time 0 and time 1, the company operates and produces value. 
At time 1, a potential buyer of control, ZV,  emerges and can purchase the 
company. At time 2, control may be transferred. Between time 2 and time 
3, there are again value-producing operations. At time 3, the company is 
dissolved. 
Note that a critical element of our analysis is that, when making the 
6.  In principle, the initial owner could design incentive contracts that would reproduce the 
effects of ownership, eliminating the agency costs associated with an increase in a.  In prac- 
tice, however, such a contract would succeed in eliminating the agency costs only by undoing 
the sale through a contract. Therefore, if the incumbent owner wants to dispose of a fraction 
of cash-flow rights, she will have to bear the increased agency costs. 60  Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Luigi Zingales 
time 0 choice between PR and PU, the initial owner will pay attention to 
the possibility that a potential buyer will emerge at time 1. This seems to 
us quite plausible in light of the evidence on the substantial frequency of 
control changes in firms that have gone p~blic.~ 
The potential buyer, who emerges at time 1, has a different valuation of 
the company,  V,, = B, + Y,v.8  The buyer's valuation may differ from that 
of the incumbent for many reasons. Different owners may have different 
managerial  ability and thus produce different  levels of  cash flow.  They 
might also have different synergies with the company or be more or less 
risk averse. Therefore, they might differ not only in their total valuation, 
VN,  but in its components as well. Consistently, we  define 1 -  a;  as the 
optimal fraction of cash-flow rights that the new buyer should retain: 
Note that the initial owner is not able to change her ownership level just 
after the first production period. This assumption is meant to capture the 
fact that the timing of the arrival of the potential buyer is uncertain and, 
therefore,  that, if  the initial owner wants to pre-position  the ownership 
structure, she faces the risk of having a suboptimal ownership structure in 
at least one production period. 
While the market for minority shares is perfectly competitive, the mar- 
ket for controlling blocks is not. Therefore, when the owner sells a fraction 
(Y  of her shares to dispersed  shareholders,  she will receive the expected 
value of those shares. By  contrast, when she trades her large block with 
another party interested in control, she will not be able to appropriate all 
the surplus from the trade. This assumption of an imperfectly competitive 
market for corporate control seems to be a realistic one. Suppose, for ex- 
ample, that some private benefits derive from a synergy with another com- 
pany owned by a potential acquiring party. This is something very specific 
to the particular buyer, and, in this situation, it seems unlikely that a seller 
could extract all the ~urplus.~ 
7. The empirical evidence indicates that controlling blocks in publicly traded companies 
are transferred rather frequently. For example, Holderness and Sheehan (1988) find that, in 
a group of 114 New York and American Stock Exchange companies each of which had a 
shareholder owning a majority interest, there were twenty-one sale-of-control transactions 
in the four-year period between  1978 and  1982. Similarly, Caprio, Floreani,  and Radaelli 
(1994) look at the frequency of the transfer of control blocks on the Milan Stock Exchange, 
where most companies have a controlling block (Zingales  1994). They report that, in the 
1970s, 35 percent of the companies experienced a control-block transfer; during the 1980s, 
the same figure was 33 percent. Similarly, Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales (1998) show that 
firms experience an unusually high level of control sales in the three years following an IPO. 
8. For simplicity, we assume that, if I and N are risk averse, this affects only the function 
B. Otherwise, we treat them as risk neutral. 
9. An alternative rationale might be that the acquisition of a company requires large fi- 
nancial resources, which are available generally only to a few wealthy individuals. Therefore, 
the sale of a company cannot always be conducted as a competitive auction. Ownership Structures and the Decision to Go Public  61 
We  assume that the incumbent will get a fraction  1 - 8 of the total 
surplus captured by the buyer and the incumbent combined. This can be 
formalized as the outcome of a bargaining game in which, with probability 
0 < 8 < 1, N has the right to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer and, with 
probability  1 -  8, the opportunity belongs to I. The main thrust of the 
results is not sensitive to the particular bargaining model chosen so long 
as the incumbent does not capture all the buyer's surplus (ie., 8 # 0). 
Initially, we assume that whoever is in control of the company in period 
2 will move to the optimal a.  In particular, if a = 0 and a* > 0, then the 
controller will sell additional shares. If a  > 0 and a* = 0, we assume that 
the controller will  freeze out minority  shareholders at the current value 
of the shares, that is, paying a  Y(a).l0  As we  show in section 2.4.2 below, 
dropping  this  assumption  introduces another  source of  divergence be- 
tween private and social optimality. 
We also assume that the discount rate is equal to zero and that the buyer 
is not liquidity constrained."  Finally, we  assume that all the parameters 
are common knowledge. 
2.2  Divergence between Private and Social Optirnality 
In this section, we show the existence of a divergence between the own- 
ership structure that maximizes the proceeds of the initial owner at the 
IPO stage and the socially efficient ownership structure (i.e., the ownership 
structure that a benevolent social planner facing the same problem as the 
initial entrepreneur will choose). In order to achieve this objective, we first 
need to illustrate how the choice of ownership structure influences whether 
a transfer of control will take place and the price at which it will take place. 
2.2.1  Conditions for a Transfer 
The first step involves identifying when control will be transferred from 
I to N as a function of the cash-flow rights sold by the incumbent (a).  If 
N gets control, he will capture V:  -  aY,.  By  contrast, if Iretains control, 
she will get V,? -  a Y,.  Thus, a transfer will take place if and only if 
(1)  v;.-  V?  > a[YJa)  - Y,(a)]. 
In what follows, we  drop the subscripts I  and N unless the context requires 
otherwise. Let AV* = V: -  and AY(a)  = Y, - Y,.  Then the condition 
for a transfer is 
(2)  AV*  > aAY(a). 
10. For an analysis of the optimal freezeout rule, see Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi (1998). 
11. Implicitly, we  also assume that the incumbent is not liquidity constrained in the sense 
that she can finance all positive net present  value projects with internal funds or riskless 
debt. We make the assumption in order to avoid the additional complication associated with 
the capital structure decision (see Israel 1992). 62  Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Luigi Zingales 
The left-hand side represents the total value generated by  the change in 
control, while the right-hand side is the effect of the transfer on minority 
shareholders. Thus, condition (2) simply says that a transfer of control will 
take place if it generates value in excess of what is captured by minority 
shareholders. 
Note that, when a = 0, there will be a transfer of control whenever it is 
socially efficient (i.e., whenever  it generates  value  AV*  > 0). Thus, the 
value of the company in the second period will always be max( V,:,  V,?]. 
As shown in Bebchuk (1994), however, when a >  0, some efficient trans- 
fers will be prevented. and some inefficient transfers will take place. Spe- 
cifically, an efficient transfer will be blocked when 
0  <  AV*  <  aAY(a), 
and an inefficient transfer will occur when 
aAY(a) <  AV*  <  0. 
As a result, when a > 0, the value of the company in the second period 
will not always be equal to max{ V:,  V,?} but will be a function of a.  We 
refer to this second-period value as V2(a). 
2.2.2  The Socially Optimal Incidence of PU 
the sum of the value of the company in the two periods. This is given by 
Since we assumed a discount rate of zero, the social planner maximizes 
(3) 
Let aFB  be the solution to program (3). Then, for a given distribution of 
potential buyers, we can define 
(4)  PUFH  =  {I:  aFR >  O} 
as the set of incumbents for whom it  is socially  optimal  to have a PU 
structure rather than a PR one. Note that aFA  can well be different from 
a*  because of the effect of a on V2. 
2.2.3  The Initial Owner’s Choice 
The initial owner chooses a  to maximize her profits (n),  not the social 
welfare (W).  The difference  between  the two  is  represented  by  the ex- 
pected gain captured by the buyer, which enters the social planner’s objec- 
tive function but not that of the initial owner. Thus. 
where G,  is N’s expected gain from the transfer.  G,,,  is the source of  the 
potential divergence between the social and the private optimization. N’s 
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(6)  G,  =  prob[transfer] E[expected gains to N I transfer]. 
Thus, the initial owner cares not only about the effect of  ci on W but also 
about its effect on G,,,. 
2.2.4  The Effect of ci on the Surplus Captured by the Buyer 
Under PR, the surplus captured by the buyer is simply 
GY =  BE[AV*lAV*  > O]prob{AV*  > 0). 
Under PU, the surplus captured by the buyer is 
GRL' =  prob{AV* - aAY(ci) > 0) 
.  BE[AV* - crAY(ci)IAV* - ciAY(ci)  > 01. 
We  are interested in studying how the choice of ownership structure 
affects the surplus captured  by  the buyer. Thus, we  want  to study the 
difference between G,PL'  and GJR.  This difference can be written (assuming 
prob{AV* -  ciAY(ci) = 0} = 0) as 
(7)  AG,Jct)  = -BaE[AY(a)IAV*  > 0 n  AV* -  ciAY(ci) > 01 
x prob{AV* > 0 n  AV* -  ciAY(ci) > 0) 
-  BE[AV*lAV* > 0 n  AV* -  crAY(ci) < 01 
x prob{AV* > 0 n  AV* - aAY(a) < 0} 
+ BE{[AV* -  aAY(a)]lAV* 5 0 n  AV* -  ciAY(ci) > 01) 
x prob{AV* I0  n  AV* -  aAY(a) > 0). 
The first term represents the expected effect that a move to PU would 
have on N's surplus in all those circumstances in which a control transfer 
would take place under both PU and PR. This effect can be either positive 
or negative, depending on whether the expected effect of a control transfer 
in those circumstances on minority shares is negative or positive. When a 
control transfer raises the value of minority shares, the presence of minor- 
ity shares leaves N with less surplus under PU than under PR. In contrast, 
when a control transfer reduces the value of minority shares, the presence 
of minority shares would enable N to extract more surplus under PU than 
under PR.I2 
The second term represents the expected surplus that N would lose from 
a move from PR to PU owing to the fact that the move would block some 
(efficient) transfers that would take place under PR. The third term repre- 
12. In Zingales (1999, the effect of a move to PU on N's surplus is always negative because 
of his assumption that a control transfer always benefits the minority shareholders. We study 
a more general setting, one in which minority shareholders can either benefit or lose from a 
control transfer, and, in this setting, the considered effect is ambiguous. 64  Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Luigi Zingales 
sents the expected surplus that N would gain from the move from PR to 
PU owing to the fact that the move would lead to some (inefficient) control 
transfers that would not take place under PR. 
2.2.5  Private versus Social Optimality 
From equation (9,  it is easy to see why the socially efficient level of a 
may diverge from the privately optimal one. In particular, given I and N, 
we have the following proposition: 
PROPOSITION  1. I will choose PU even though PR  is socially optimal ifand 
only if AG,  < W(a)  - W(0)fbr  some a. Vice versa, I will choose PR even 
though PU is socially optimal if  and only if AG,  > W(a)  - W(0)  jor all a. 
PROOF.  See the appendix. 
Note that a necessary condition for AG,  < W(a) - W(0)  for some a, 
given that W(a)  < W(0)  for all a (i.e., PR is socially optimal), is AG,  < 0 
for some a.  Similarly, a necessary condition for AG,  > W(a)  - W(0)  for 
all a,  given that W(a)  > W(0)  for some a (i.e., PU is socially optimal), is 
AC,v >  0 for some a. 
The intuition is as follows. If the choice between PR and PU affects the 
expected  surplus captured by the potential  buyer, it drives a wedge be- 
tween the social and the private optimum. In particular, if a positive a de- 
creases the expected surplus extracted by the buyer to a sufficient extent, 
it will distort the initial owner's choice in favor of going public (excessive 
PU). On the other hand, if a positive a increases the expected surplus cap- 
tured by the rival to a sufficient extent, it will distort the decision of the 
initial owner against going public (excessive PR). 
Having established the possibility of a divergence, we can now explore 
the direction and the magnitude of this divergence. This is the subject of 
the next section. 
2.3  The Direction of the Distortion 
2.3.1  The Importance of AY 
The source of the externality that generates the divergence between pri- 
vate and social incentives is the effect that a control transfer has on minor- 
ity shareholders. When AY(a) = 0, there is no externality, and thus there 
is no divergence. This idea is formalized in the following proposition: 
PROPOSITION  2. If AY(a) = 0 (i.  e., if Y[a]  is the same for any possible 
controlling shareholder),  then AC,  = 0, and the privately  optimal choice 
between PU and PR  is socially optimal. 
PROOF.  If AY(a) = 0, then G,PR = G,Pu, so AG,,,(a)  = 0. Then the conclu- 
sion follows directly from proposition  1. Ownership Structures and the Decision to Go Public  65 
AY(a)  is the effect of a sale of control on minority shareholders. Thus, 
it will be zero only if minority shareholders are completely unaffected by 
the transaction. There are both theoretical and empirical reasons to doubt 
that this is the case. Theoretically, minority shareholders’ value might well 
be affected by  a control transfer owing to a change in either V or B (or 
both) because, under the existing corporate law rules, there is no mecha- 
nism that  shields minority shareholders from the economic effects of a 
control transfer on their shares. 
Empirically, AY(a)  can be estimated. Barclay and Holderness (1991), for 
instance, find that block trades that lead to a change in control generate 
an abnormal return of 18 percent for minority  shareholder^.'^ This figure 
represents only the unanticipated component of the externality. Neverthe- 
less, it suggests that, on average, the externality is positive in the United 
States. It also suggests that the size of the externality imposed on minority 
shareholders by control transfers is far from trivial. The blocks analyzed 
by  Barclay and Holderness (1991) represent about 30 percent of the com- 
panies’ stock. Therefore, just the unanticipated component of the exter- 
nality represents about 13 percent of the value of a firm.14 
In sum, under current corporate law rules, AY(a)  should not be expected 
to be generally equal to zero and thereby eliminate all distortions. Neverthe- 
less, proposition 2 is useful in attempting to determine what rules can elimi- 
nate the externalities of control transfers. We return to this issue in section 
2.5 below. For now, we assume that AY(a)  # 0 and explore its consequences. 
2.3.2  The Relation between AY and AV 
An  important  role  in  determining the direction  of  the distortion  is 
played by the correlation between the effect that a change of control has 
on total value and its effect on the value of minority shareholders: 
PROPOSITION  3. VAY(a)  and AV* have opposite signs  for all a, I, and n! 
then AG,(a)  > 0 for all a, I, and N, and the potential distortion is in the 
direction of  an excessive incidence of PR 
PROOF.  The only interesting case is that in which AV* > 0 and AY(a) 
< 0. When AV* > 0 and AY(a) < 0, the first term in (7) is nonnegative 
(positive when the probability term is positive and zero when the probabil- 
ity term is zero). AV* > 0 and AY(a) <  0 also imply that AV* -  aAY >  0. 
Thus, all transactions that will  take place under PR will  also take place 
under PU. This implies that the second term in (7) is zero. Finally, given 
AV* -  aAY(a) >  0,  the last term in (7) is positive when the probability is 
13. This figure is obtained by  averaging the 19 percent return obtained by  the forty-one 
firms that were subsequently taken private and the 8.1 percent return obtained by  the forty- 
five firms that experienced changes in control while remaining publicly traded. 
14. A similar study conducted by  Caprio, Floreani, and Radaelli (1994) for the Italian 
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positive and zero when the probability is zero. Thus, if there is any chance 
of a transaction under PU, it must mean that the sum of the probability 
terms  in the first term and in the third term  is positive and, thus, that 
either the first term or the third term is positive. 
AY(a)  and AV* are likely to have opposite signs when legal constraints 
on self-dealing transactions are weak and different controlling shareholders 
can generate different synergies. In this case, a controlling shareholder with 
more synergy (higher V)  will also be the one with a greater business relation- 
ship with the acquired company and, thus, the one who is able to extract 
more value from the company (lower Y)  through self-dealing transactions. 
A different scenario, and perhaps the one that is more likely to occur in 
the United States, is that in which AY(a)  and AV* have the same sign. In 
this case, we have the following proposition: 
PROPOSITION  4. IfAY(a)  and AV* have the same sign for all a, I, and N, 
and ifproh(AV* 5 0 fl  AV* -  aAY(a)  > 01 = 0, then AG,,(a) < 0 for all 
a, I, and N, and the potential distortion is in the direction of an excessive 
incidence of PU 
PROOF.  The third term in (7) is positive if the probability is positive and 
zero if the probability is zero. In addition, given that AY(a)  has the same 
sign as AV*, which is positive in the first term in (7),  the first term in (7) 
is negative. Finally, the second term is nonpositive by definition. 
One scenario in which the conditions of this proposition are satisfied is 
that in which the private benefits of control are a given fraction of the firm’s 
total value. Another scenario in which the conditions of this proposition are 
likely to hold is that in which the differences among the private benefits of 
different controlling shareholders are small. In this latter case, an acquirer 
with a higher  V will also have a higher  I: Thus, in countries where the pri- 
vate benefits of control tend to be small (as they are in the United States), 
the distortion is likely to be in the direction of excessive PU. 
Since Vcannot be directly observed, any statement trying to identify the 
condition that is more likely to hold in a particular country is inevitably 
speculative. The value of cash flow to security holders (Y),  however, can 
be observed. We can draw certain inferences from AY regarding the rela- 
tion between the signs of AY and AV 
PROPOSITION  5. If in a control transfer AY(cw) > 0, then AY(a)  and AV* 
must have the same sign in that transfer: 
PROOF.  Assume not. Then it should be possible that a transfer occurs 
where AY(a)  is positive and AV* is negative. But this implies that AV* - 
aAY <  0,  which makes a transfer impossible, contradicting the hypothesis. 
When I and N  agree to a transfer, it must  be the case that either the 
transfer generates value AV* > 0 or it generates a negative externality on 
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agreement. So, when we observe a transfer of control with AY(a) > 0, we 
are guaranteed that AV* > 0 also. 
Among other things, AY(a)  is a function of the legal regime governing 
sale-of-control transactions. In particular, the following corollary of prop- 
osition 5 can be stated: 
COROLLARY  1. If corporate law rules ensure that minority shareholders 
never lose from control transfers,  then AY(a)  and AV* will always have the 
same sign, and the distortion is in the direction of  an excessive incidence of PU 
One example of a rule  that ensures that minority  shareholders  never 
lose from  a control transfer is  the  equal opportunity rule,  which  gives 
minority shareholders the option to be bought out at the same price paid 
by the acquirer. We discuss this rule more extensively in section 2.4.1 be- 
low. Another rule that can achieve the same result is the right to sue major- 
ity shareholders in the case of a predatory acquisition (i.e., an acquisition 
that reduces  Y). 
This corollary is important in assessing the likely direction of the distor- 
tion  in  practice.  For example,  in countries where minority shareholder 
rights are well protected (as they are in the United States), the changes in 
total value and in minority  shareholders’ value  are always in the same 
direction,  and, as a result, the distortion is clearly in favor of PU. This 
conclusion highlights an interesting externality of any legislation aimed at 
improving the protection  of minority  shareholders. It is consistent  with 
Roe’s (1994) claim that populist legislation in favor of minority sharehold- 
ers has forced the American  system toward  an excessive separation  of 
ownership from control. Interestingly, however, the mechanism by which 
that excess takes place is different. In Roe (1994), the law directly forbids 
some players (specifically, financial institutions) from assuming the role of 
large shareholders. In our case, it is the protection of minority sharehold- 
ers that makes it very convenient for the incumbent to disperse ownership. 
While the discussion presented above suggests that AY(a)  and AV* are 
likely to have the same sign in the United  States, it does not guarantee 
that their  signs are always the same (as the conditions of proposition 4 
would require). On the other hand, the existing empirical evidence indi- 
cates that, in the majority (but not necessarily in all) of the cases, AY(a) 
and AV* do have the same sign in the United States. 
2.3.3 
Let us assume that both cases, that of proposition 3 and that of proposi- 
tion 4, are possible and analyze what we can learn from the fact that, on 
average, AY(a)  is positive: 
The Expected Value of AY 
PROPOSITION  6. A necessary condition for AG, to he negative, and thus  for 
the distortion to he in  favor of Pc! is that the expected efect on minority  share- 
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>  01 >  0).  A sufJicient conditionfor AG, to be negative, and thus  jor  the distor- 
tion to be in favor of PV; is that the expected effect ofa transfer of control on 
minorityshareholders ispositive (E[AY(a)  I AV* -  aAY(a)  >  01 >  0). 
PROOF.  See the appendix. 
The source of the distortion is that the surplus captured by the incum- 
bent is modified by her choice of ownership structure. A necessary condi- 
tion for her to benefit from going public is that, by going public, she suc- 
ceeds in extracting a larger share of the rents. This occurs only if a transfer 
of control generates a positive externality on minority shareholders, which 
the incumbent can capture up front, in the price fetched at the TPO  stage. 
This condition is exactly E{AY(a)lAV* > 01 > 0. 
The  condition  outlined  above,  however,  is  not  sufficient because  a 
change in the ownership structure also affects which transfer of control 
will take place. In particular, the fact that in a PU structure the incumbent 
does not own 100 percent of the cash-flow rights allows for the possibility 
that some transfer will take place even when  AV* < 0 and Ay(01)  < 0. 
Thus, the sufficient condition of proposition  6 requires that the positive 
externality exists even after we account for the changes in the set of control 
transfers that will take place. 
Correspondingly, we have the following proposition: 
PROPOSITION  7. A necessary condition,for AG, to be positive, and thusfor 
the distortion to be in favor of PR, is  that the expected effect of a transfer of 
control on minority shareholders is negative (E[AY(ct)IAV* -  01  AY(a)> 01 
<  0).  A suflcient condition jbr AG, to be positive, and thus  for the distortion 
to be in favor of PR, is that the expected effect on minority shareholders of 
a value-enhancing transfer of  control is negative (E[AY(a)lAV*  > 01  < 0). 
PROOF.  See the appendix. 
When a transfer of control generates a negative externality on minority 
shareholders, the amount of surplus that the incumbent can capture is re- 
duced by going public. As a result, a necessary condition for the distortion 
to be in favor of PR is that the externality is on average negative. Again, 
this condition does not ensure the existence of a distortion because a PU 
structure changes the set of control transfers  that will  take place. The 
sufficient condition of proposition 7 requires that the negative externality 
exists even within the modified set of control transfers. 
Barclay and Holderness (1991) show that, on average, the effect of a con- 
trol transfer on the share price is positive. It is, then, legitimate to conclude 
that, on average, the expected value of a transfer of control on minority 
shareholders in the United States is positive. This suggests that the distor- 
tion in the United States is likely to be in the direction of excessive PU. 
Two qualifications are warranted here. First, all firms in the sample used 
by  Barclay and Holderness (1991) are firms that choose the PU structure. 
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E[AY(a)  I transfer occurring] is negative, but we observe only the ones for 
which AY > 0 because these firms are the most likely to go public. While 
possible, this hypothesis is rather unlikely for the United States given the 
great propensity of companies to go public there. The problem may be more 
relevant for other countries, where only a small fraction of companies 
choose to go public. 
Second, the evidence discussed here comes only from the United States. 
We are aware of another paper that finds similar results in Italy (see Caprio, 
Floreani, and Radaelli 1994). It would be interesting, however, to investi- 
gate the effect of control transfers in different institutional environments, 
environments in which different rules for the protection of minority share- 
holders hold. 
2.4  Extensions 
2.4.1  The Equal Opportunity Rule 
In many countries other than the United States, there exists a law requir- 
ing that the acquirer of a control block extend an offer at the same price to 
all shareholders-the  equal opportunity rule (EOR). Even in the United 
States, where such a law does not exist, many companies insert a similar re- 
quirement in their corporate charter. Therefore, it is of practical relevance 
to understand the effects of an EOR on the direction of the distortion. 
Corollary 1 has established that, if corporate law eliminates the possibil- 
ity that AY <  0 in an acquisition, then the distortion is always in the direc- 
tion of excessive PU. It is easy to see that this is exactly the effect produced 
by the EOR, provided that the incumbent’s private benefits of control are 
nonnegative. In fact, under the EOR, minority shareholders get at least as 
much as Z(per share). Since I will agree to a transfer only if she is better off, 
the minority shareholders (who, given that B 2 0, will start from a lower 
price per  share) will  be made better off  as well.15 Thus, all transfers of 
control generate a positive externality. It follows that the EOR ensures that 
the divergence between private and social optimality is in the direction of 
an excessive use of PU. Thus, other things being equal, countries that have 
the EOR should have proportionally more companies going public. 
2.4.2  Difficulties in Implementing a Freezeout in the Last Period 
Thus far, we  have assumed that whoever ends up in control at time 2 
will be able to move to the optimal ownership level at no additional cost. 
In particular, we  assumed that, if 01 > 0, the period 2 controller would be 
able to buy out all minority shares at 01 Y((Y).  However, as Burkart, Gromb, 
15. Since we defined B as the private benefits of control net of the risk-bearing costs, it is 
possible that B is negative. In such a case, however, the incumbent will have an interest in 
selling shares at least to the point at which B 2 0. Thus, for all practical purposes, we  can 
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and Panunzi (1 998) point out, when a move to complete ownership pro- 
duces  some efficiency  gains,  dispersed  shareholders  will  not  tender  at 
ci Y(ci).  Even if we introduce the possibility of a freezeout, it is likely that 
a premium above a  Y(a)  might be needed. It is, thus, important to consider 
what happens when a controlling shareholder faces a cost in moving to- 
ward the optimal ownership level. 
To  examine the implications of such difficulties, consider the extreme 
case in which a freezeout at time 2 is impossible. In this case, any ci > 0 
chosen at time  1 becomes irreversible, whereas a choice of a = 0 at time 
1 can be modified at time 2. Under this assumption, an initial PU structure 
may impose a cost on whoever is in control at t = 2 by impeding a move 
to the optimal a.  This cost is going to be borne at least partially by  N, 
and, therefore, it will not be fully internalized by I in her initial decision. 
If  the distortion  is in favor  of PU to begin with  (as we  found to be 
somewhat more likely for the United States), this new factor will exacer- 
bate that  situation. However, if the initial distortion is against PU, this 
new factor will mitigate that situation. This is not at all surprising: in a 
world of second best, some distortion can actually improve welfare. 
2.5  Policy Implications for the Rules Governing 
Sale-of-Control Transactions 
The source of the divergence, we  have seen, is that  the choice of an 
initial ownership structure is influenced by  the prospect of a future sale- 
of-control transaction. As we have seen before, both the market rule pre- 
vailing in the United  States and the EOR prevailing  in other countries 
generate some distortions in the choice of ownership. It is natural to won- 
der, then, whether it is possible to regulate sale-of-control transactions in a 
way that would eliminate the distortion in the choice of the initial owner- 
ship structure. 
Such a regulatory approach can be identified but might be hard to im- 
plement. As we saw, the divergence between private and social optimality 
results from the fact that, under the existing rules for sale-of-control trans- 
actions, a transfer of control from I to Nmay impose a positive or negative 
externality on minority  shareholders. This problem will  disappear if we 
have an arrangement that ensures, in the event of a control transfer, that 
minority shareholders will end up with exactly Y,. Bebchuk (1994) demon- 
strates that such an arrangement will ensure ex  post efficiency-that  is, 
control blocks will be transferred  if and only if  the transfer  is efficient. 
Our analysis points out that such an arrangement will also lead to an ex 
ante efficient choice of ownership structure and, in particular, to an effi- 
cient incidence of control blocks. 
As Bebchuk (1994) shows, there are two arrangements that ensure that 
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both require that courts and minority shareholders have sufficient informa- 
tion. First, if courts have the same information concerning Y,  as Zand Nare 
assumed to have, then a combination of appraisal rights and freezeout 
rights would produce the desired result. Under this arrangement, minority 
shareholders will have an appraisal right to redeem their shares for a value 
of  Y,  as estimated by  the court, and Z  will also have a freezeout right to 
buy  out the minority shareholders prior to the transaction  for a value 
of  Y,  as estimated by  the court. If courts can observe  Y,  accurately, this 
arrangement would ensure that minority shareholders always get Y,.  But, 
if courts might err in estimating  Y, (and in a direction that can be antici- 
pated by  Z  and N),  then this arrangement will  not ensure that minority 
shareholders get an expected value of  Y,  in sale-of-control transactions. 
Second, if minority shareholders have the same information concerning 
Y,  and Y,as  Iand  N are assumed to have, then a specialized voting arrange- 
ment can be used. Under this arrangement, a control transfer will require a 
vote of approval by a majority of the minority shareholders; furthermore, a 
majority of the minority shareholders will be able to approve a transaction 
in which they end up with less than  Y,  by,  say, approving a payment from 
the company to Z  or N. Under this arrangement, if minority shareholders 
know Y,  and  Y,  as Z  and N are assumed to know, then all the transactions 
that are brought to shareholders for approval and that obtain such ap- 
proval will be ones that provide the minority shareholders with a value 
equal to  Y,. Once again, it can be shown that, if  minority shareholders 
might err in estimating either  Y, or  Y, (and in a direction that can be 
anticipated by  I and N), the sale-of-control transactions will still involve 
an expected externality with respect to minority shareholders. 
2.6  Conclusions 
This  paper  shows  that  the  ownership  structure chosen  by  a  value- 
maximizing entrepreneur might differ from the one that is socially opti- 
mal. Focusing on the choice between PR and PU structures, we show how 
this choice might be distorted, and we identify conditions under which the 
distortion will be in the direction of an excessive and suboptimal incidence 
of going public. 
The results of the model indicate which empirical evidence would be 
useful for determining the direction of the identified distortion. Some of 
the evidence already  exists, and combining  it with our results suggests 
that, in the United States, the distortion tends to be in the direction of an 
excessive incidence of going public. But more empirical work, along the 
lines suggested by our results, would be needed to reach firm conclusions 
about the direction of the distortions. 
While our analysis has focused on the choice between PR and PU struc- 
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also applies to the choice between a PU structure and a structure of dis- 
persed ownership (DI). The choice between PU and DI might also have 
an external effect on potential buyers of control by influencing the condi- 
tions for a transfer and the buyer's surplus in a transfer. This external effect 
is analyzed in Bebchuk (1999), which shows that, when the corporate law 
system is lax and the private benefits of control are consequently large, a 
PU structure will enable the initial shareholders to extract more surplus 
from control transfers than will a DI structure. Therefore, when private ben- 
efits of control are large, publicly traded companies tend to have a PU struc- 
ture (as is indeed the case), and they might choose a PU structure even if 
a DI structure is superior from a social point of view. Thus, the divergence 
between the private and the social optimality in the choice of ownership 
structure, which this paper has identified, is a general problem, one that 
should be recognized by students of corporate ownership structure. 
Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 1 
For PU to be chosen even if  PR is optimal, we  must have that, while 
W(0)  > W(a)  for all a >  0, there is an a such that rI(0) < II(a).  Substitut- 
ing (5), this is equivalent to saying that there is an a such that 0 < W(0) 
For PR to be chosen even if  PU is optimal, we  must have that, while 
there is  an a > 0 such that  W(0)  < W(a),  II(0) > n(a)  for all a > 0. 
Substituting (5),  this is equivalent to saying that, for all a > 0,  W(0) - 
W(a)  > -AGN. 
Proof of Proposition 6 
Necessary Condition. We can rewrite (7) as 
- W(a)  < -AGN. 
AG,(a)  = -  BaE[AY(a)lAV* > 0 n  AV* - aAY(a) > 01 
x prob{AV* > 0 n  AV* -  aAY(a) > 01 
- BaE[AY(a)IAV* > 0 n  AV*-  aAY(a) < 01 
x prob{AV* > 0 n  AV* -  aAY(a) < 0) 
-  BE[AV* -  aAY(a)IAV* > 0 n  AV* -  aAY(a) < 01 
x prob{AV* > 0 n  AV* -  aAY(a) < 0) 
+ OE[AV* -  aAY(a)IAV* < 0 n  AV* - aAY(a) > 01 
x prob{AV* 5 0 n  AV* - aAY(a) > 0). Ownership Structures and the Decision to Go Public  73 
Collecting terms, we obtain (assuming prob{AV* -  aAY(a) = O]  = 0) 
(Al)  AG,(a)  = -BaE[AY(a)IAV*  > 01  prob{AV* > 0) 
+ BE[  I AV* - aAY( a)  I I AV* and AV* -  aAY( a)  have opposite signs] 
x prob{AV* and AV*-  aAY(a) have opposite signs}. 
Since the second term in (Al) is always nonnegative, a necessary condi- 
tion for AGJa)  to be negative is that the first term is negative, that is, 
E[AY(a)lAv* > O]prob(Av* > 0} > 0. 
Suficient Condition. Rewrite the last term in (7) as 
€IE[AV*IAV*  I0  n  AV* - aAY(a) > 01 
x  prob{AV*  I  0 n AV* - aAY(a) > 0} 
-BaE[AY(a)IAV*  I  0 n AV* - aAY(a) > 01 
x  prob{AV*  I  0 n AV* - aAY(a) >  O}. 
Collecting terms, we can rewrite AGN  as follows: 
(A2)  AG,(a)  = -  BaE[AY(a)IAV* -  CYAY(~)  > 01 
x prob{AV* -  CLAY(&)  > 0} 
- BE[AV*lAV* > 0 n  AV* -  aAY(a) < 01 
x prob{AV* > 0 n  AV* -  aAY(a) < 0) 
+ BE[AV*(AV*  I0  n  AV* -  aAY(a) > 01 
x prob{ AV* I 0 n  AV* -  aAY  (a)  > 0) , 
or 
(A3)  AG,(  a)  = -  BaE[AY (a)  I transfer under PU] 
x prob { transfer under PU} 
- BE[  1 AV*ll AV* and AV* -  aAY  (a)  have opposite signs] 
x prob{AV* and AV* -  aAY(a) have opposite signs}. 
The second term of (A3) is always nonpositive. Thus, qAY(a) I transfer 
under PU]prob{ transfer under PU} > 0 is sufficient to ensure that AGN(a) 
< 0. 
Proof of Proposition 7 
Necessary Condition. Since the second term in (A3) is always nonpositive, 
a  necessary condition  for  AG,(a)  to  be  positive is that  the first  term 
is  positive,  that  is,  E[AY(a)  1  transfer  under  PU]prob{ transfer  under 
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Suj5cient Condition. Since the second term in (Al)  is always nonnegative, 
E[AY(cu)  I  AV* > 01  is sufficient to ensure that AG,  be positive. 
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Comment  Merritt B. Fox 
The ideal level of public ownership is determined by achieving the proper 
trade-off  between  private  ownership’s illiquidity  and public ownership’s 
agency costs of management. According to the traditional view, in a coun- 
try with a highly developed capital market, such as the United States, each 
firm makes the socially optimal choice concerning its ownership structure. 
This is because its founding entrepreneur feels the full social effects of her 
choice when she decides what portion, if any, of her firm’s shares should 
be sold to the public. In many other countries, however, institutional fac- 
tors, such as weak legal protections for outside shareholders, limit the de- 
velopment  of capital markets,  and this  in  turn restricts entrepreneurial 
choice and results in too little public ownership. 
In their paper, Lucian Bebchuk and Luigi Zingales enlarge our under- 
standing of public versus private ownership by questioning this traditional 
view. They do so in the context of an entrepreneur’s choice of ownership 
structure in a situation where, regardless  of any public sale, she retains 
voting control of the firm during the current period but may sell this con- 
trol  at some point  in  the future. The paper makes  three  points of real 
importance to the study of both comparative corporate governance and 
transition economics. First, it shows that, under certain circumstances, a 
country with a highly developed capital market can have too much public 
ownership. This is because the entrepreneur’s decision is distorted from a 
social point of view by the fact that, when a subsequent transfer of control 
increases the verifiable cash flow available to minority shareholders, these 
shareholders are the beneficiaries of a positive externality flowing from the 
transferee’s improved management. Since the prospect of this externality 
increases share price at the time of the entrepreneur’s initial public offering 
(IPO), the entrepreneur can capture a larger piece of the surplus generated 
by such a transfer by  selling a larger  portion of the firm at the time of 
the IPO. 
Second, the paper shows how legal rules can affect this bias toward too 
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much public ownership. Specifically, an “equal opportunity” rule, whereby 
the acquirer of a control block must extend an offer at the same price to 
all shareholders, exacerbates the problem. The problem is also exacerbated 
by  a legal structure that results in minority shareholders receiving, at the 
time of a freezeout by a new controlling shareholder, a premium for their 
shares above the value  of these shares  as pro rata  claims on the firm’s 
verifiable cash flows under the original entrepreneur’s management. 
Third, the paper enriches our understanding of the institutional factors 
that can lead to too little public ownership in countries with  less well- 
developed capital markets. It is already well understood that weak protec- 
tions for minority shareholders will have a negative effect on public owner- 
ship because fear that the entrepreneur will engage in such overreaching 
reduces the price at which shares can be sold. Bebchuk and Zingales, how- 
ever, go beyond this usual analysis by considering the role of expectations 
concerning future control changes. Specifically, they show that, where the 
expected  impact  of  a value-enhancing  transfer  of control  on minority 
shareholders is negative (which is more likely to be the case in a country 
with weak minority shareholder protections), public ownership will occur 
even less often than has been previously understood. This is because, in 
such a situation, the transfer of control would on average create a negative 
externality on the minority shareholders. As  a result, a lower level of pub- 
lic ownership will allow the entrepreneur to capture a larger share of the 
surplus created by the transfer and thus affect the division of rents be- 
tween her and the transferee. 
Bebchuk  and Zingales’s paper  stimulates several observations,  which 
are set out below. I parallel their notation throughout. 
The Welfare Effects of  the Distortion 
A closer examination of the social welfare effects of the distortion iden- 
tified by  Bebchuk and Zingales helps sharpen the policy implications of 
their analysis. 
A Simple One-Period Model with No Possibility of a Control Transfer 
I start this examination by  looking at a simple one-period model with 
no potential transfer of control. Thus, no potential for distortion exists. As 
in Bebchuk and Zingales’s paper, the entrepreneur intends to keep voting 
control regardless of what ownership structure she chooses. 
If the entrepreneur decides to keep the firm privately held (PR), that is, 
if (Y  = 0, 
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where CE(a) is the certainty equivalent value to the entrepreneur of the 
ownership structure she has chosen, S is synergies and is not a function of 
a  since the entrepreneur is assumed to retain voting control whatever a 
she chooses, Y(a)  is identifiable cash flow available for pro rata distribu- 
tion and is a negative function of a,  and D(a)  is dollar measure of disutil- 
ity from lack of diversification, which is also a negative function of a. 
If the entrepreneur decides to sell some of the firm’s shares to the public, 
that is, if a > 0, 
(C2)  CE(a)  =  S +  R(a)  + (1 - a)Y(a)  +  aY(a)  - D(cY), 
where R(a)  is the “rip-off” factor (due to managerial shirking, direct di- 
versions of cash flow and assets, and transactions in which management 
is interested), R(a)  is a positive function of a  (because the greater  the 
public’s share of identifiable cash flow, the less “rip-offs” involve just mov- 
ing money from one of the entrepreneur’s pockets to the other), and a  Y(a) 
is cash received from selling shares to the public.  Equation  (3) follows 
directly from equation (2): 
(C3)  CE(a)  =  S  + R(a)+ Y(a)  -D(a). 
uc 
As demonstrated by Jensen and Meckling (1 976), the sum of R(a)  + Y(a) 
is a negative function of a,  reflecting the fact that reduction in verifiable 
income resulting from managerial rip-offs is greater than the utility that 
managers gain from these rip-offs. D(a),  managerial disutility from lack 
of diversification,  is also a negative function of a  because the entrepre- 
neur’s sale of a larger portion of the firm’s shares permits her to diversify 
a larger portion of her wealth. Thus, there is a trade-off between R(a)  + 
Y(a)  and D(cw). The entrepreneur maximizes  her utility, represented  by 
CE(cw), by choosing a*,  which optimizes this trade-off. The entrepreneur’s 
choice is socially optimal because the investing public pays only for what 
it gets. 
The Consequences of Adding the Possibility of a Transfer of Control 
Now introduce a second period and the possibility  of a second owner. 
As Bebchuk and Zingales have shown, the initial entrepreneur will choose 
an aI  different from a*,  and, because of this deviation, social welfare will 
not be maximized. 
What are the consequences of this deviation? First, consider the first 
period. The effects of the deviation can be divided into its effect on the 
return on capital and its effect on the return on entrepreneurship. As for 
its effect on the return  on capital, if  aI > a*,  there is  a bad trade-off 
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being below the optimal level. This lowers the return on capital and, hence, 
its supply. On the other hand, if a,  < a*, it raises Y and actually increases 
return on capital. As for the effect of the deviation, first-period returns on 
entrepreneurship are diminished by a deviation  in either direction since 
any deviation from a*  leads to an inefficient trade-off between diversifica- 
tion and agency costs. This, however, will be more than compensated for 
by the entrepreneur’s gain in the second period because of the increased 
portion of second owners’ rents that entrepreneurs capture. 
Next consider the consequences of the deviation in the second period. 
Returns on capital are hurt by a deviation either way from a*. Some trans- 
fers that would decrease  Y will go through. Some transfers that would 
increase Y will be blocked. The deviation increases the returns to entrepre- 
neurship since it permits entrepreneurs to capture more of the potential 
control purchaser’s rents. For the same reason, returns to being a potential 
control purchaser are hurt by the deviation. 
Policy Implications 
This analysis has several policy implications. We  may believe, for ex- 
ample, that entrepreneurship and second ownership are relatively inelas- 
tically supplied, that capital is relatively more elastically supplied, but that 
the amount of capital supplied in the economy is, for other reasons, sub- 
optimal (i.e., that capital formation needs to be encouraged). In that case, 
we  should be particularly concerned with a deviation if we  think that aI 
> a* (i.e., that AG is negative) since that would lower the supply of capital. 
We  should not be as concerned if aI < a* since that would increase the 
supply of capital without  promoting significant other distortions in the 
economy. Thus, if we  are somewhat uncertain as to whether a,  is greater 
than or less than a*,  we should err on the side of a policy that discourages 
PU; that is, we should favor a policy that tends to reduce al.  On the other 
hand, we may believe that capital and second ownership are relatively in- 
elastically supplied and that it is entrepreneurship that is both relatively 
more elastically supplied and, for other reasons, undersupplied. In that 
event, a deviation in either direction should not bother us since allowing 
the deviation increases the rents available to entrepreneurs, thus prompt- 
ing an increase in the amount of entrepreneurship supplied, without pro- 
moting serious other distortions in the economy. 
Do AY and AV  Have the Same Sign?‘ 
Bebchuk and Zingales state: “Another scenario in which the conditions 
of this proposition are likely to hold is that in which the differences among 
1. AY is the change in Y  from a sale of control, and AVis the difference between the value 
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the private benefits of different controlling shareholders are small. In this 
. . . case, an acquirer with a higher  V will also have a higher  Y Thus, in 
countries where the private benefits of control tend to be small (as they 
are in the United States), the distortion is likely to be in the direction of 
excessive PU” (section 2.3.2). The first two sentences are clearly true. As 
for the third sentence, however, all we  really know  is  the status of the 
United  States relative to other countries-that  the private benefits from 
control are smaller in the United States than they are in other countries. 
We do not know that in the United States they are small relative to 1.:  Yet 
it is the smallness of private benefits relative to V that is necessary for the 
conclusion in the third sentence to follow. This observation is important 
because Bebchuk and Zingales’s suggestion that the United States has too 
much public ownership rests on the assumption that AY and AV  have the 
same sign (see their proposition 4). 
Is AY Positive? 
Bebchuk and Zingales’s proposition 6 shows that a sufficient condition 
for AGN to be negative and hence for there to be a distortion in favor of 
PU is that the expected effect of a transfer of control on minority share- 
holders be positive. They conclude that this is the case in the United States. 
They base this conclusion on Barclay and Holderness (1991), which shows 
abnormal positive returns to changes in ownership blocks. Barclay and 
Holderness’s study forms an uncertain foundation for such a conclusion. 
After all, their findings could well be the result  of signaling. Outsiders 
might conclude from a control buyer’s interest in the stock that they had 
previously underestimated  whoever might  be  in control.  This seems 
quite possible given that much of the actual effect of changes in ownership 
on Y would be anticipated in price well prior to the actual announcement 
of a control-transfer transaction. 
The Desirability of an Equal Opportunity Rule 
In the extensions to their analysis, the authors consider the desirability 
of an equal opportunity rule whereby the acquirer of a control block is 
required  to extend an offer at the same price to all shareholders. They 
conclude that such a rule would be bad policy in the United States, where 
they assume that AG <  0. They show that an equal opportunity rule would 
increase a  and thus, when AG <  0, increase the deviation from social opti- 
mality. 
It is worth noting, however, that, whatever the situation in the United 
States, an equal opportunity rule might be good for another country. This 
is because, in other countries, AG may be greater than zero since AY and 
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for control are large and thus, relative to K  vary more from one owner 
to another. 
Multiple-Period, Multiple-Owner Extension 
Suppose that liquidation  is many  years off, that  there will  be several 
controlling owners, and that the discount rate is positive. Working back, 
starting with the penultimate owner, each owner would want to have a  > 
a*  in order to try to capture the rents of the owner after him. The devia- 
tions each period may be quite small, however, given that current-period 
efficiency must be traded off against gains that, at least in part, are far in 
the future. This raises the possibility that the problem of too much public 
ownership may not be of large magnitude. 
Extension: Freezeout by First Owner and Appraisal 
Bebchuk and Zingales suggest that the tendency toward too much pub- 
lic ownership would  be solved by  a combination of  giving the entrepre- 
neur, prior to a control sale, a right to freeze out minority shareholders at 
a price equaling  Y,  (the verifiable cash flow available for pro rata distribu- 
tion with the firm under the incumbent entrepreneur’s management) and 
giving the shareholders appraisal rights at the same price. Their concern 
is that there might be a predictable bias by  the courts in  estimating  Y,. 
Such a bias, however, could be corrected by a change in the legal standard. 
The more interesting issue is the effect of uncertainty concerning this esti- 
mate even if the estimate is expected to be unbiased since courts will inevi- 
tably be uncertain in their estimates. 
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